On September 1-st 1939 without declaration of war the Nazi German Army invaded Poland from the West. On September 17-th the Soviet Red Army occupied the eastern territories of Poland and so, according to the terms of the Ribbentrop-Molotow pact (23-rd August 1939), Poland became divided between two enemies and ceased to exist as a state.
The situation called for immediate defense of Polish sovereignty by both the authorities-in-exile (the Government of the Polish Republic-in Exile in London) as well as those in Poland (numerous political underground organizations). The majority of the underground organizations growing in support as Second World War progressed were subordinated to the Government-in-exile and developed an extended network of institutions of the Polish Underground State. The major military force of this Underground State was the HOME ARMY (Armia Krajowa) with its Commander-in-Chief subordinate to the Polish Armed Forces commanded by Supreme Commander in London. The main task of Home Army was organizing actions
against German occupation forces. Wearing either spoilt German uniforms or just plain street clothes, these homemade soldiers were the Polish Home Army-the resistance fighters of German-occupied Poland. Fathers, grandfathers and young girls and boys fought side by side with only red and white armbands for identification. They came together to defend, as best as they could, their beloved homeland.

By summer 1944, the Soviet Army began its offensive in Bielorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic region. The Germans could not muster the sufficient man-power to form an effective line of defense. The Soviet offensive had within five weeks covered a distance of about 1000 km and by the last week of July, the Soviets were approaching the outskirts of Warsaw. This encouraged the leadership of the Polish Home Army, with permission from Polish government-in-exile in London, to start the mass uprising. The Government was hoping to achieve the control of Warsaw by forces loyal to the legal London government and to broaden a worldwide popular support for this government. On August 1-st, the Polish Home Army, with a force of approximately 45-thousand partisans, attacked the German in Warsaw. Joined in the fight by the city's Polish population, they took control of most of the city. But the Germans sent reinforcements and the Red Army, encamped within sight across the Vistula river, never attempted assistance. Even more, the Soviets refused permission to the Americans and British to use their airfields to drop ammunition and relief supplies to Polish
fighters.
When hostilities ceased, after sixty-three days of fighting, eighty-five percent of the city was razed, and the Polish Home Army almost annihilated. The Germans deported the remaining population. When the German were eventually defeated there were no forces left to oppose Soviet political domination in Poland.

(below is a detailed history of Polish Home Army based on the English translation of the book "Polish Underground State" published in 1999 in Warsaw by SZZAK-Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM)

'The Military Structures
of the Polish Underground State'

The Armia Krajowa [Polish Home Army, "AK"] that comprised the armed forces of the Polish Underground State [PPP] was the most numerous, long lasting, and the most diverse in its forms of combat of all the underground armies in Europe during the Second World War.
Its historic development evolved from 27th September 1939 with the inauguration of the Sluzba Zwyciestwa Polski [Service for the Victory of Poland "SZP"] (a military-political organization) and the construction upon its foundations of the Zwiazek Walki Zbrojnej [Union for the Armed Struggle "ZWZ"]. The latter was already a typically military structure with the character of a General Staff, which eventually developed into the fully organized underground army; the Armia Krajowa, "AK". So, for the whole period from September 1939 until its dissolution in January 1945, this was the same underg-round army, though sometimes differently named. At every phase of its existence, it was a legitimate entity, justified by the legal and constitutional mandate of the authorities of the Polish State.
This army was born, a result of the initiatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, Field Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly and Brigadier General Michal Kara-szewicz-Tokarzewski. They founded a military-political organization called the Service for the Victory of Poland "SZP". Firstly, one has to underline the fact that the SZP was the only clandestine organization among the many others which arose in the autumn of 1939, that was established by the authorized agents of the highest authorities of the Republic of Poland. This automatically placed it above the others that had arisen in various parts of occupied Poland. Its task was to undertake decisive and determined action against the invaders in every aspect of their activity in Poland. This fight was to be carried to the enemy using all available resources until Poland's liberation and restoration of her pre-war frontiers. Therefore, in accordance with these principles, the first assignment began in bringing all of Poland's occupied territories into the SZP's sphere of influence.
Here, we should recall that the territory of the Second Republic of Poland had been divided between the eastern and western aggressors as a result of their military action and agreements they had made beforehand. In the first phase, Poland was occupied by the Germans and the USSR, the latter taking over half the territory of the Second Republic. The situation became more complicated when the USSR transferred Wilno and north-eastern Poland to Lithuania. Thus, until June 1940, Polish clandestine military and civilian structures were at war with three quite different oppressors. When the USSR annexed Lithuania in summer 1940 there were only two, and after Germany's attack on the USSR in June 1940, Germany occupied all Polish territory. The administrative divisions created by the aggres-sors had a direct influence on the organizational and operational prospects of the underground army. These prospects differed in Polish territory annexed to the Third Reich (Pomerania, Greater Poland and Silesia), from those in the "General Government" (central Poland) and from those in the eastern territories. In com-paring clandestine operating conditions between German and Soviet occupation, it appears that it was harder to operate underground under Soviet occupation. This was as a result of the differing objectives of the two oppressors. From the outset, the German oppressor wanted physically to eliminate the Polish nation, whereas the Soviet oppressor primarily wanted to break society's moral resistance, and for the population to succumb to its will by an ex-traordinarily developed system of infiltrating the conquered com-munity. Thus while anti-German resistance had a unifying effect on society, anti-Soviet resistance was met by the Soviets with mass arrests and mass deportations of the most unyielding elements of Polish society. This, together with the policy of exploiting national and ethnic differences weakened society's unity.
One should also appreciate the differing circumstances on the various territories solely under German occupation. As already mentioned, there were three distinct zones - lands annexed by the Reich, the General Government [GG], and eastern territories taken following the German attack on the USSR in 1941. The most difficult conditions existed on territories annexed by the Reich. Guerrilla actions against the enemy in different areas were of differing natures and took into consideration the prevailing con-ditions. The publication and distribution of the AK press was different in annexed territories and within the GG. Therefore a simple calculation is inadequate when trying to assess the full results of AK activity. Apart from concrete and measurable actions, the AK's information and propaganda apparatus was enormously important in letting society know that an underground Polish Army existed, and was operating against the enemy.
Having made these general remarks, let us return to the develop-ment and activities of the AK.
From October 1939, on occupied Polish territory, the SZP began the process of expanding its activity into bigger and bigger areas, initially by setting up regional chains of command. Meanwhile, within the Government of the Republic of Poland [RP] that had been functioning from September 1939 in Paris, lead by General Wladyslaw Sikorski, arose the concept of organizing a strictly military independence organization on Polish soil. Its task would be to undertake the armed struggle against the enemy. As a result of much planning and the decisions of 8th and 13th November 1939 taken by the highest state authorities, the ZWZ was born. Its commander was General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, codename "Godziemba". In accordance with its earlier established regulatory principles the ZWZ was a strictly military organization, uniform in structure and the only one operating on national soil. It was founded on the universally accepted principles of hierarchy, answerability and discipline. An extraordinarily important factor regarding the posi-tion of the ZWZ and later the AK in the Polish Underground State and the whole military and civilian policy of the authorities of the Republic of Poland was the fact that from the very beginning, they were regarded as a component part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, answerable through its immediate Commander to the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. Thus, all officers and other ranks continued to be regarded as soldiers of an army operating at the front, and they were accorded all the moral and material rights of soldiers on active service. At the outbreak of the armed uprising planned for the final phase of the war ordered by the Government RP, area and regional commanders had the right of military command over all armed forces personnel in a given territory. They could also pass this right down the chain of command to subordinate unit com-manders. All this, let us underline once more, clearly defined the role and position of the AK as part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, being the Polish Army operating underground.
The strategic intention of using the AK in the final, decisive phase of the war, to which we will return later, caused the Comman-der-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces General Sikorski to com-ment in his dispatch of September 1941 addressed to the Comman-der AK and the Government Delegate RP thus: "In the present situation the most important factor in the coming battle to regain the independence of Poland is the Military Organization within the country, which I regard as the major part of the armed forces under my command. This affirmation was not merely a rhetorical remark. It gave a real place to the AK within the armed forces of Poland, above all due to its size, its ability to mobilize rapidly on national soil, and the planned utilization of these forces at the decisive moment of the war. This clearly underlined the regular nature of Poland's armed forces, part of them serving abroad and part of them serving within the country itself. On 14th February 1942, the Commander-in-Chief abolished the name "ZWZ" and stated that "All soldiers on active military service within the country are an integral part of the Armia Krajowa [Polish Home Army AK]... and answerable to its commanders". This renaming of the ZWZ as the AK did not involve any organizational changes. It did however elevate the armed forces within the country from the status of a "Union' to that of an "Army" in which all soldiers on active military service were included.
The formal and legal recognition of the AK into the structure of the Polish Underground State was made by the decree of the President RP on 1st September 1942 "Concerning the temporary organization of authority on the territory of the Republic" reviewed with minor changes in April 1944. In accordance with this decree the relationship of the Commander of the Armed Forces within the country to the Government Delegate RP within the country, became the same as the relationship of the Commander-
-in-Chief to the Government RP in exile. This meant, therefore, that the existing system of the highest military and state authorities in exile was grafted the apparatus of the Polish Underground State. In conformity with the relevant regulations, the Commander AK had all the powers of the Commander-in-Chief (up until the return of the latter to Poland) relating to Polish territory and the Armed Forces operating in it. The Commander AK was therefore an important factor in the life and struggle of the Polish Underground State. He managed the material and personnel needed to undertake military action, and from the summer of 1943 stood at the head of the Directorate of the Underground Conflict, a body composed of the AK High Command and the Delegate of the Polish Government within the country.
The leaders of the AK (through its evolution from the SZP and ZWZ) in occupied Poland were: General Michal Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski code-name "Torwid", General Stefan Rowecki code-name "Grot", General Tadeusz Komorowski code-name "Bor", General Leopold Okulicki code-name "Niedzwiadek". From November 1939 to June 1940 the office of Commander ZWZ was held by General
Kazimierz Sosnkowski code-name "Godziemba" who directed the organization from France. The central leadership apparatus of the AK was its High Com-mand that had evolved from the SZP command of September 1939. The formal establishment of Commander ZWZ within the country and ZWZ High Command within the country happened in 1940, after the evacuation of Polish military (including the Commander ZWZ) and state authorities from France to Great Britain.
The High Command, organized within the country from 1939 became over 1943-1944 an extensively and accurately constructed leadership apparatus responsible for planning and current opera-tions of the Armed Forces within the country. In the clandestine "today" was planned the uprising of "tomorrow". Also, looking to the future was the plan for Armed Forces reconstruction, the accomplishment of which was to take place after a victorious general uprising. During its peak period of development, before engaging in open warfare in Warsaw in the summer of 1944, nearly four thousand people were working in AK High Command. This comp-licated mechanism functioned very efficiently, given the conditions of occupation. The High Command gathered together within itself all the problems of the life and struggle of the AK, overseeing its current and planned operations. It was divided into Departments, General Staff and Offices. Department I dealt with all kinds of organizational problems. Department II was responsible for intel-ligence and counter Intelligence. Department III was concerned with planning for the forthcoming Uprising and training. Department IV was the Quartermaster, supplying and servicing the Underground army. Department V looked after the problems of communication. Department VI, otherwise the Bureau of Information and Propa-ganda, contained the center of the AK's propaganda activity. Department VII, the Office of Finance and Accounting dealt with financial issues. The problems of constructing an underground administration in close contact with civilian structures were concent-rated in the Directorate of Military Offices. Current military opera-tions were initially controlled by the Reprisal Union Directorate and later by the Directorate of Diversionary Operations ["Kedyw"]. Supervision of the whole question of communications belonged to the Chief of Military Communications. After the appointment of General Rowecki as Delegate of the Ministry of National Defense in AK High Command, the Department of National Defense was organized.
AK High Command controlled local Commands in the field, which as we have already mentioned, started forming as early as 1939 under the SZP. The SZP had divided up the country into district Commands which were directly answerable to SZP High Command in Warsaw. By the end of 1939, five such provincial field Commands had been organized in Warsaw, Lublin, Kielce, Krakow and Lodz, and two more on the eastern boundaries in Wilno and Lwow. Work had begun on extending the network into other regions of Poland.
At the turn of the year 1939-1940 the first orders from ZWZ High Command in Paris arrived in Poland, addressed to the Chief of Staff SZP High Command Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Rowecki. From this moment on, one can regard the reorganization of the SZP into the ZWZ as factual. In the early days, six Area Commands were answerable to ZWZ High Command in France. These were Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, Torun, Bialystok, and Lwow. The Areas were then sub-divided into Districts. As this system meant that command and control was very difficult, it was simplified by appointing two Occupied Area Commands - German Occupied Area Command ZWZ and Soviet Occupied Area Com-mand ZWZ. In practice, in view of enormous difficulties in organizing Soviet Occupied Area Command, in Warsaw German Occupied Area Command extended its ZWZ influence into territory occupied by the Soviets. One should note that the organizational scheme contained in those first orders from Paris - Area Command- District Command - Local Command remained largely unchanged until the end of the Armed Forces within the country's existence. In some instances an extra level of command and control was intro-duced between District and Local Command - Sub District Com-mand. To ensure better command and control, several Local Com-mands were merged into a Regional Inspectorate, reporting to District Command. The smallest link in the organizational chain of command was a Detachment that was made up of one or two boroughs. The final shape of the AK command and control network was thus: High Command - Area Command - District Command-Sub District Command (in certain circumstances) - Regional Inspectorate - Local Command - Regional Command (not always)- Detachment Command. Area, District and Local Commands were a reflection (of course to a smaller extent) of the way High Command was organized. Some Districts reported directly to High Command in Warsaw.
The amount of Inspectorates and Local Commands was not constant. The amount varied according to the existing situation in a given territory, and new links were created or closed down as necessary. For example in August 1942, 92 Inspectorates and 253 Local Commands were in operation, and in February 1944, 89 Inspectorates and 278 Local Commands were operating.
One should here underline that although the principal operational area of the AK was the whole territory of the Poland Republic, its organizational structures reached beyond 1939 national borders. A prime example of this was an external structure of the Wilno District; Kowienski SubDistrict Lithuania, which had an ethnically Polish population. External Local Commands - Gliwice and Opole were also founded in the Silesian District.
AK structures were also created among officers and other ranks of the Polish Army in Hungary, who had been interned there after the military actions of 1939. They formed AK District codename "Liszt". The network of the AK existed even within German POW camps for Polish prisoners of war. The commanding officers of these clandestine prison camp organizations reported directly to AK High Command, with whom they maintained constant contact. Including these prisoners and internees into the AK had two motives. Firstly, it was planned that they would take part in the general Uprising, and secondly it was a valuable morale booster to the officers and soldiers "behind the wire". The ever present need for diversionary and propaganda actions (Operation "N", to which we will return) provoked the establishment of a District Command AK in Berlin, which had to work under extraordinarily difficult conditions. In describing the organization and reach of the AK we cannot omit the "Bases'. They were originally set up as communications detachments between ZWZ High Command in France and Poland as early as 1939. They were eventually subordinated to the ZWZ-AK High Command in Poland. They were Base no.1 in Budapest, Base no.2 in Bucharest, Base no.3 initially in Kowno then later in Stockholm. Additionally there were other communications detachments, for example in Paris and Istanbul.
Bases and communications detachments enabled mutual communi-cation between ZWZ High Command in Poland and the authorities RP abroad. The Armed Forces within the country answered to the Commander-in-Chief (initially General Wladyslaw Sikorski and after his death in 1943, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, and after the latter's dismissal by those state and military factors that took on the mantle of Commander-in-Chief). After the final dissolution of the ZWZ High Command in exile, its personnel were moved on to form the Independent Division for the Country attached to the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in London. After a while, for security reasons, its name was changed to (Special) Section VI General Staff C-in-C. This Section collated all matters pertaining to the country and acted as an agency for the Commander ZWZ-AK operating in occupied Poland. Chiefs of Section VI General Staff C-in-C were: Lieutenant Colonel Marian J. Smolenski, Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Rudnicki, Lieutenant Colonel Michal Protasewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Marian Utnik. Material and personnel needs for the AK - that part of the Armed Forces RP within the country- converged in, and were initially dealt with by Section VI.
Here we should note another important event in the ZWZ-AK's history. We earlier mentioned the issue of the incorporation of the AK into the Polish Underground State and the Armed Forces RP. It should be underlined that in 1944, after lengthy exertions by the Polish civil and military authorities, the Allies finally recognized the AK as a regular military force. On 29th August 1944 Great Britain declared that "the Polish Home Army now mobilized, constitutes a regular military force, being an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces". This meant, among other things, that AK prisoners taken by the Germans were to be treated in accordance with the relevant international conventions. In practice, apart from during the War-saw Uprising, the Germans ignored these international laws. The USSR totally ignored them.
Becoming part of the Armed Forces RP carried many consequen-ces for the AK. Firstly, according to the statute, it could not be a conglomerate of related organizations but had to be the only military formation operating on Poland's territory. This en-tailed bringing people into its fold who found themselves in other clandestine organizations of a military nature that had arisen, thus creating one homogenous underground army from many clandestine groups. This was not an end in itself, however. It was necessary because of the AK's main task, that of preparing and carrying out the victorious general Uprising in the final phase of the war. The planners of the Uprising had to know exactly what military strength they could use during the decisive attack. This army's soldiers had to be equally well trained. This was why the central authority abroad as well as those within the country placed great emphasis on the importance of the integration process. As early as 1940, the Com-mander of German Occupied Area Command ZWZ, Colonel Rowecki was given full official powers to complete this integration, though in fact it had been going on since the days of the SZP. Generally speaking, the problem of integration was one of the most difficult to resolve. Even as early as the autumn of 1939 various types of clandestine organizations arose, all of which were dedicated to fighting the enemy. Furthermore, political parties and movements formed their own military structures, considering them important assets in the future political landscape. For example, the Peasant Battalions formed the military arm of the People's movement [predominantly a rural organisation], the National movement had the National Military Organization. The smaller military and political organizations subordinated themselves to the ZWZ without too much disagreement (though not without reservations) such as the People's Guard organized by the Polish Socialist Party. Integrating the military units of the larger political parties threw up many problems, however. In view of these problems, the Commander--in-Chief issued an order on 1st August 1942 subordinating all military units whose aim was to take part in the battle, and all auxiliary military units to AK command. This order, although considerably strengthening the position of the AK leadership in integration negotiations, did not finish this integration process. In November 1942 the National Military Organization joined up under the AK banner. However, those members of the National movement who did not accept integration, formed the National Armed Forces, who, although formally signing acts of integration in the spring of 1944 in fact continued to remain outside the structures of the Polish Army. Only by the spring of 1943 was an integration agreement finalized with the Peasant Battalions, who placed their tactical units under AK command. The military unit of the communist movement- the People's Guard, later People's Army always remained outside the structures of the AK. Talks with the Polish Workers' Party in 1943 had brought no results. The demands of the communists exceeded the conditions of integration that had been required by even the biggest military organizations. Commanders of military formations joining the AK were allotted rank depending on the size and importance of their formation. The process of integration, lasting for several years, did not bring every single military for-mation into the AK. The National Armed Forces and the com-munist People's Army remained outside. This does not at all mean that integration was a fiasco. One has to remember that in the clandestine reality of the situation, the AK could only bring moral pressure to bear on those opposed to integration. So, in this context a decided majority of clandestine military organizations volunteered to come under AK command. This testifies to the enormous moral authority of the AK and the Polish Underground State, and also to the political maturity of people who chose to integrate into the Armed Forces within the country and their subordinate structures. One must emphasize the fact that the AK as the Polish Army underground was a citizen's army. Entering its ranks did not mean abandoning one's political convictions or one's political movement. On the contrary, the press of various political movements was distributed, and their traditions were respected. Integrated forma-tions brought to the ranks of the AK their ideals and their visions of a future Poland. Thus the AK really became a Polish Army, in which served people of numerous political colors and shades - all that was required of them was to recognize the constitutional authorities of the Republic and place the fight for independence above party and political considerations.
Particular emphasis should be placed on the fact that this army, numbering well over 350,000 combatants during the peak period of its existence, was principally a volunteer army. In fact in October 1941 the Commander of the Armed Forces within the country, in one of his orders, pointed out that the authorities had never ordered a demobilization so therefore all those who had been on active military service at the outbreak of war were still actually on active military service. However, in practice anyone who wanted to avoid military service could do so. Under clandestine conditions, there was not much the Armed Forces could do about it. The same applied to young men who reached military call-up age during the war. So, entry into the ranks of the AK, despite it formally being the underground Polish Army was the individual decision of each and every Polish citizen. For this reason as well, one should not consider this army simply from the perspective of how many platoons it had, or its volunteer intake. One has to look at it from a specific angle. The AK was made up of thousands of people of various political persuasions and beliefs who had volunteered for clandestine military service - at a time of violence and intolerance the Armia Krajowa stood for democracy, tolerance and a sense of duty.
In its initial concept the ZWZ was to have been of a "cadre" nature [cadre - basic military unit forming a nucleus for expansion when necessary]. The growing desire of society to serve in the ranks of a clandestine army and fight for independence meant that it soon became apparent that it would be impossible for the ZWZ to retain a cadre nature. So, three categories of the underground army were established: active service (i.e. commands and combat platoons), the reserve (members of dissolved military and socio-political forma-tions, officers and non-commissioned officers forming the cadres of battalions and companies to be used at the outbreak of the general Uprising) and the general levy, in other words, that part of society supporting the ZWZ in its actions for independence. These catego-ries remained in place until the final days of the ZWZ-AK. There was a certain drop in volunteer intake in the second half of 1940 after the fall of France. This was partly as a result of orders from the authorities RP instructing the ZWZ to concentrate on long-term activities, and partly due to public downheartedness at the defeat of an ally. The beginning of 1941 saw a steady, though regular, increase in ZWZ-AK volunteer intake. The lengthening duration of the war, the integration of organizations into the AK, the changing situation after Germany's attack on the USSR and the coming of military service age among the young men of the Scout groups of the Szare Szeregi [Grey Ranks] - were all factors which caused the increase. In the first half of 1944 the roll of the AK exceeded 350,000 people. It was greater, therefore, than the peacetime roll of the Polish Army at the beginning of 1939. One fact should be under-lined, which is that the actual total in the Armed Forces within the country was greater. The endurance and fighting capability of this army, we must reiterate, would have been impossible without the active support and co-operation of its own public.
In 1944, 10,000 officers were serving in the AK. Regular Polish Army officers held a decided majority of command positions. Bearing in mind the status of the AK as a part of Poland's regular Armed Forces this was quite natural. The particular circumstances under which this army worked, however, sometimes meant those senior positions were held by reservists, often of lower rank. From the fragmentary evidence available, it seems that reserve officers and non-commissioned often performed their duties better than regular officers. An important factor in this was that officers with years of regular army training found it harder to adapt to untypical guerrilla or even more so clandestine operations requiring a different predisposition. This was truer still of the middle and senior officer cadres. It is also worth mentioning that quite frequently civilians held senior posi-tions at various levels of command, with great success. The cadre working under the difficult circumstances of occupation was strengt-hened on occasion by parachutists of the Polish Armed Forces abroad who had volunteered to serve in the occupied country. Over the course of the war, however, it only proved possible to parachute in a part of those trained; barely 316 made it to their native soil. From the point of view of the army's needs this was very little. They were, however, high-class specialists trained in diversionary tactics, sabotage and intelligence. They passed on their specialist knowledge to others, thus extending the scope of their effectiveness. In desc-ribing the matters of the cadre and people of that AK one cannot omit the role of women within their ranks. It is hard to find an aspect of service or operations in which women were absent. As couriers they ensured the constant and accurate communications of the AK. They distributed the Underground press and publications and they worked unfailingly in the medical services. They operated in intelligence, in weapons production and in diversions and sabota-ge. To complete the picture of this underground army's profile, one should also add that the Polish intellectual elite was present at many levels. Scientists, professors and academics from universities were involved in specialist intelligence units, providing their expertise in dealing with the flow of information. They worked in the production of war materiel, constructing machine pistols, hand grenades and mines. Arts and humanities scholars worked in the area of infor-mation and propaganda, producing publications of very high quali-ty. All in all, every level and area of society was represented in the ranks of this truly national army.
The prime task of the AK was the fight to regain independence and restore Poland's frontiers to at least those of before 1939. The concept of the struggle was worked out mutually by the highest civilian and military authorities in exile and those within the country. The official standpoint of the constitutional authorities RP was similarly arrived at. The principal directives for the operations of the Armed Forces within the country were formulated by the highest authorities of Republic of Poland in exile, and sent to the leadership in Poland, who then prepared plans for armed action on the basis of these directives.
After deliberations by the Polish authorities in France, plans for AK operations were systematically arranged at the beginning of 1940 thus: intelligence, sabotage, suppression, diversion, and upri-sing. The last main task was the preparation of the final shape of the plans for the final phase of the war - the execution of a victorious general Uprising - while continuing the battle against the oppressor. A major factor affecting all the actions of the armed struggles of the AK during all of its history between 1939-1945 was the general military and political situation on all fronts of the Second World War. The overall situation had a fundamental influence on succes-sive plans for the General Uprising and on the day-to-day battle and on pre-planned operations.
The issue of preparations for the uprising was worked out in the most concise way in the AK High Command's 1942 "Principles of the Uprising". In it was written that: "The Uprising must be planned in lengthy, precise and specific manner, culminating in a swift, violent, and simultaneous attack at all points, which by staking everything on one card and acting boldly, should within a few hours lead to the night of the Uprising".
As early as 1940 work had started in Warsaw on the future uprising's general concept on the basis of a directive from ZWZ High Command in France. The work crystallized into the first plan for a general uprising, Operational Report no.54, which was sent encrypted from Poland in February 1941. The main factors that determined the shape of the plan were the occupation of Poland by both Germany and the USSR, and German military successes that in 1940 defeated Denmark, Norway, Holland and France and also the USSR's annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as well as Bessarabia and Bukovina. The plan foresaw that a major action against the Germans could only take place as a result of military setbacks that would break down German morale, and that in the absence of military victory, the German army would abandon their posts and return home to their homes and families. The assessment of the enemy concluded that the forces of the Uprising would have two differing German elements to contend with. One would consist of the police, administration and Nazi party organizations that would fight to the finish, and the other was the great mass of the German army composed mainly of people who just wanted to survive the war and return home. This view of the future was influenced to no small extent by the not so distant past of 1918, when relatively small Polish military units had disarmed German army formations of considerable size. They were well aware that the situation was somewhat different, and already had experience of these contemporary Germans. Those who subscribed to the theory of future internal unrest within German ranks undertook a psychological form of warfare, known as Operation "N" and also the day to day battle, to which we will return later. Here we should emphasize that the planned armed action was not only concerned with military operations themselves, but also with all the complex preparations of rear echelon organization, logistics, supply and the organization of an administration which was to function on territory liberated from the oppressor. When assessing the realistic chances of expanding ZWZ activity into areas under German occupation, it was stated that "not all actions of the Uprising will have the same intensity." It was thought that in the General Government and Lodz district, the Polish side would be strong enough to achieve its aims without too much difficulty, however in the Poznan District and Pomerania operations would prove much more difficult, and might even have to be delayed. "It would be best" - it was stated - "to achieve a simultaneous landing operation by our armies in exile together with our uprising operation and a concurrent attack by our air force". One should add that a great unknown factor here was the question of the USSR's attitude to all this. Various models were considered, including the possibility of future Soviet victories, and the Soviet removal of Germans from Polish territory. If the latter were to happen, Poland's Underground State would have to remain underground. In such a very specific turn of events it was agreed that there would be armed resistance against the Russians as protest to the world against a new invasion - intended to put moral pressure on the Allies and force their intervention.
The work of the ZWZ General Staff was not restricted to planning and analysis, but also included concrete moves forward. In September 1940, ZWZ High Command ordered Area and District Commanders to draw up operational plans to control terrain, select constant military objectives, cut off the enemy's lines of retreat, to specify what military forces would be needed to achieve these objectives and to appoint commanders for each operation.
Operational Report No.54 reached the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief some days after Germany's attack on the USSR which changed Poland's political and military situation. Poland became the hinterland of an enormous war front. A nation that had up to then been an oppressor joined the group of Allies and following the signing of an agreement, a Polish Army was to form up on his territory.
One should note that plans were also under way in the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in London. The issue of suppor-ting the Uprising became more and more of a priority in the plans of the Polish Armed Forces, and at least two of its components, the Polish Air Force and the Parachute Brigade were marked out for operations in Poland. In the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief's 1941 "Plan for the Utilization of all Polish Armed Forces" priority was given to the forthcoming Uprising - planned and executed by the ZWZ - and the role of Poland's regular forces-in-exile in supporting it. In concert with other Allied operations, the Polish Uprising was seen as a fundamental factor in defeating the Germans. Meanwhile, however, cold analysis of the situation meant that instructions the C-in-C sent to Poland in March 1942 advised the AK that they would have to primarily depend on their own resources.
A second plan for a general uprising was produced by AK High Command in September 1942, which was sent as Operational Report 154 to General Staff C-in-C in London. The plan marked out seven main objectives for the uprising; I. The overthrow of the German oppressor by the destruction of his administration, party organs, and German population and by the removal of the German army by way of "voluntary or enforced evacuation"; II. The acquisition of arms and war materiel as described; III. To oppose "Ukrainian chains"; IV. To commence the reconstruction of the regular armed forces; V. To co-operate in the reconstruction of the administration; VI. To maintain an absolute state of peace in the country; VII. To start operations in areas of Poland not yet under control-as soon as the situation and resources permit - and to gain control in areas vital for a future Poland.
A condition for the outbreak of an uprising was the clear manifestation of increasing signs of a forthcoming catastrophe for the Germans. The start of the uprising would be ordered by the C-in-C in London, and the precise moment of entering into battle would be established by Commander of the Armed Forces within the country. The Uprising was to include all territory of the Republic which were ethnographically Polish, in other words ter-ritory with a Polish majority and where conditions allowed the simultaneous commencement of operations. A base for the Uprising needed to be established, and the General Government and ad-joining territory was chosen (though excluding Lwow District). The remaining parts of Poland, despite their populations wish to take part in action, did not have sufficient local military resources (without outside assistance) for success. These included Silesia, Poznan, Pomerania and also Wilno, Nowogrod, Polesie and Eastern Lesser Poland. In analyzing the situation, the AK Commander very accurately assessed Russia as an ally only in a formal sense. He wrote: "In reality I am of the opinion that Russia will show a hostile attitude to us if her military strength permits. If her military strength is insufficient, this attitude will simply be masked". So as in the first plan, many variants of the military course of events, and how the AK should respond to them, were taken into consideration. Analysis of all the factors described above came to the following conclusions:
the prime enemies on territory selected for the Uprising were the German Nazi party administrators and members and secondly the German army. Next in line was the German army retreating from the Eastern Front back to the Reich. Perceived as additional enemies were the Ukrainians and Lithuanians. It was considered that the Ukrainians would force Poland to fight for Lwow. Everyone was well aware, therefore, that the battle would be accompanied by many problems. Though it was still considered that the USSR constituted a realistic major danger, in order not to overshadow the prospect of the forthcoming uprising, concrete preparation were made for the battle against the Germans. In accordance with the instructions from the General Staff C-in-C, the Uprising would begin when the conditions were right, and would rely on its own forces and resources. The Uprising had to be victorious, it was stated quite flatly: "the Uprising cannot be allowed to fail." One of the conditions for its implementation was its integration with the other operations of the Allied armies on the continent of Europe. The plan for the Uprising was closely linked with the Armed Forces Reconstruction plan, in other words the swiftest possible reorganization of the army following the taking of control in a given territory that would enable opposition to the enemy and defend the borders of the country. The basis of the plan was the dislocation and organization of the Polish Army before 1939. During the clandestine period, organizational schemes were worked out, as were ranks, positions and preparations for given military formations. At the end of 1943, at High Command level, the entire picture of this work became apparent. Staff positions were designated, specific directions were given for arms production and active service units, and in the field, the majority of regiments were already taking shape. Guerrilla units were already using pre-war infantry and cavalry regiment numerical designations.
In view of the developing political and military situation in 1943 (the turning point of Stalingrad on the eastern front, worsening relations between the USSR and Poland, and in April the breaking off of relations, the increasing questioning by the USSR of Poland's eastern borders) the role of the Soviet factor grew increasingly important, and in time became a decisive element.
In February 1943, the Commander AK in a dispatch to the C-in-C London that there was an increasing need for the Uprising not to be undertaken simultaneously, but zone by zone, starting in the east. In the first two eastern zones (from Wilno to Lwow and the Bialystok-Brzesc-Bug-San line) the commencement of Uprising would depend not on the order of battle of the German army, but on the encroachment of the Russians.
The problems of the Uprising took on a more and more political aspect. The Uprising depended more and more on the international situation, in which the increasingly hostile attitude of the USSR to the view of Polish independence as presented by the Polish Government in London took a greater role. This had an increasingly detrimental effect on Polish requests to the Allies for material help for the AK, and the inclusion of the Polish Uprising into the strategic plans of the Allies. With increasing frequency, Lieutenant Colonel Leon Mitkiewicz, Deputy Chief of Staff C-in-C, the Polish representative in the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington heard high ranking American and British staff officers asking "And what about Rus-sia?" whenever he presented the Polish point of view. At the same time, the problem of the Allies attitude to the AK also became a test of their attitude to the independence of Poland and of our main aim in taking part in the war - the restitution of an inviolate Polish State founded on its own principles.
The analysis of the international situation in 1943 carried out at the highest levels of the Polish State in exile led in October to the release of special Instructions to the country. Generally speaking, it foresaw two scenarios - the implementation of the Uprising with the approbation of the Allies, or if that failed to materialize - the mobilization of the country to undertake sabotage and diversionary actions against the Germans which would be politically demonst-rative in nature.
As soon as it had received the above instructions, AK High Command started working on two parallel tracks. On one hand, it maintained the original plan for the Uprising, and on the other it started work on a new operational variant called "Burza" [Storm]. The result of this work was the order signed on 20th November precisely establishing "Burza". It was consistent with Polish Government guidelines apart from one point. The Commander AK ordered commanders and units that would take part in fighting the retreating Germans to make themselves known to the advancing Russians. He argued that he "could see the possibility of voids being created on Polish soil through military factors representing the Republic and its lawful authorities not stepping forwards towards the Russians. If they do, all our actions will subsequently be seen as factors in assisting the Soviets". This opinion divided the Delegature of the Government as well as the National Political Representation. Let us add that in February 1944, the Government of Poland approved this standpoint. In orders directed to Area and District Commanders, the Commander AK underlined that all war preparations of the AK were aimed at operations against the Germans, and not on any account were they to lead to armed operations against the advancing Russians apart from essential acts of self-defense. Armed operations by the AK against the Germans included the stubborn harassment of their retreating rearguard and major diversionary actions throughout the whole country, particularly on lines of communication. On shielded terrain all armed forces and resources available would be brought to action, and at base all guerrilla and available units would engage, together with the required amount of armed platoons and all resources as far as they were available. "Burza" was to start as soon as the Germans began a general retreat through Poland. As soon as the Russians arrived, the units were to cease operations. The attitude towards the USSR was a very complicated problem. This was after the suspension (in fact breaking) of diplomatic relations by the USSR. The USSR was distancing itself from being our formal ally to being an ally of our other allies. The Poles tried to minimize an eventual (an in fact unavoidable) conflict while still underlining their rights. For this reason as well it was ordered that on no account should Russian guerrillas fighting Germans on Polish territory be hindered. Poles should behave as hosts towards the Soviet army advancing onto Polish soil. "The local Commanding Officer" the order read - "should present himself; together with the represen-tative of the local civilian administration, to the Commanding Officer of the Soviet military unit and place themselves at his disposal". They were, however, to always remember that their isolation from the Polish authorities was only temporary, that those Polish authorities and not the Russians were the legitimate aut-horities, that the scope of Soviet activities should be limited by the Polish constitutional authorities, that any attempt to integrate those advancing with the Russians into detachments organized by the communists were illegal and were to be opposed in a determined fashion. The Armia Krajowa carried out "Burza', unlike the earlier plan for the Upri-sing, in 1944.
Meanwhile, in the context of plans for the Uprising, we should examine the issues of the day to day battle of the AK. As we know, the main aim of the AK was the preparation and victorious realization of a general uprising at the decisive moment of the war. In the first period of its existence, the AK was primarily set up as an organization that would develop and be the foundation for all further operations. Based on instructions received from France in March 1940, Colonel Rowecki gave out guidelines concerning sabotage and diversionary operations. They included a) the repression of people and organizations aiding the oppressors and the carrying out of death sentences on traitors and informers
b) sabotage against railway transport of engine fuel and lubricants, grain and crops, against armament and food production facilities, against fuel and armaments storage facilities and c) diversionary operations. As far as the latter was concerned, he stated: "In today's situation, we must rule out any spontaneous or sporadic armed or diversionary acts. All actions must have a sense of purpose and a definite aim closely linked with the planned course of military operations, and they can only be carried out on my orders" The above formula of a sense of purpose and definite aims was the quintessential concept of the armed actions of the AK in the day-to-day struggle, and not only in its early period. Foreseeing that these operations would shortly have to take place, Colonel Rowecki instructed all Area and District Commanders to work out diversionary action plans on their own territory and in accordance with their own capabilities. He also instructed them to work these plans out in the minutest detail. It was not permissible, therefore, to risk improvised operations or those, which for one reason or another had little chance of success. All planned operational terrain and objectives were to be reconnoitered thoroughly, the chances of success were to be analyzed (was the objective guarded or not), required resources were to be calculated, the method of attack itself was to be carefully planned, and finally various lines of withdrawal or camouflage had to be worked out.
In April 1940 a special formation called the Retaliation Union was formed within the framework of the ZWZ. Using a system of diversionary patrols or sometimes, larger for-mations, it carried out operations using ZWZ High Command guidelines. At its head was Major Franciszek Niepok6lczycki, code-name "Teodor".
The fall of France in the summer of 1940 influenced the decision to postpone, almost to the point of abandoning, all armed action with the exception of operations to safeguard the existence of the organization. In February 1941, facing, as it was judged, a new phase of the war, specifically the anticipated German attack on Great Britain, an intensification of diversionary operations was ordered. The attack by Germany on the Soviet Union and its accompanying situation activated day-to-day military operations. As much sabotage as possible was carried out on German occupied territory, and attacks were carried out on the rear echelons of the German armies attacking the USSR. Options for guerrilla actions immediately behind the front lines were discarded as being prematu-re. A screen for the forthcoming Uprising was formed in the east in the shape of the "Wachlarz" [Fan] organization, which covered territory on and to the east of the pre-war Polish border. Both zones were divided from Warsaw in the direction of the Dnieper river and Dzwina river into five numbered parts going from south to north. They had arranged operational directions, mainly concentrating on rail-way lines and roads from west to east. The first head of "Wachlarz" was Colonel Jan Wlodarkiewicz codename "Jan" and then Lieute-nant Colonel Remigiusz Grochoiski. The initial designation of "Wachlarz" only as a screen for the Uprising relatively quickly changed, and it became a sabotage and diversionary tactics unit.
Many factors affected the shape and concept of the day-to-day struggle, especially the ruthless attitude of the German oppressor who was committed to the physical destruction of the Polish Nation. One has to remember the effect of the communist factor, which was active underground in representing the political and military aspira-tions of the interests of the USSR. All these issues came under the scrutiny of AK High Command analysts. The day-to-day struggle had to be conducted in such a way to deal the enemy blows without causing a general insurrection (for which conditions did not yet exist), but at the same time not discouraging people to join the AK who, bearing in mind the already long period of the occupation, might be seduced by the attractive slogans of the communists to immediately take up arms against the oppressor (without a thought for losses). As a result of these deliberations and analyses, the Commander AK took the decision to increase diversionary opera-tions in the east and enlarge guerrilla units. Similarly, in the second half of 1942 the Commander AK reported to the C-in-C that he intended to put all the Armed Forces within the country on an intensified war footing, and in pursuing this course of action to maximize the level of sabotage, strengthen diversionary actions, intensify the liquidation of informers, traitors and Germans, and prepare acts of suppression on a greater scale.
The transition from preparation to execution was initiated in autumn 1942 by the setting up of the Directorate of Diversionary Action (Kedyw) whose aims and tasks were formulated in January 1943. The first aim of the "Kedyw' was to harass the enemy and hit him hard by sabotage and diversionary actions and reprisals against the oppressor for acts of violence towards Polish society. Its second aim was training and toughening soldiers for military operations in the forthcoming Uprising, and "maintaining a combative attitude within society and thus preparing an atmosphere favorable to the Uprising". The head of Kedyw High Command was Colonel August Emil Fieldorf codename "Nil". In 1944 this function was taken over by Colonel Jan Mazur-kiewicz codename "Radoslaw". Organizationally, the Kedyw constituted a distinct, strictly separate structure on whose shoulders rested the bulk of the day-to-day battle.
It should be particularly underlined that the day-to-day armed struggle of the AK was not something chaotic or incidental, but consisted of centrally planned, thought out and supervised opera-tions intended to bring measurable material and psychological effects. In March 1943 the operational tasks of the Kedyw were precisely defined thus: 1. Diversionary actions on the railway network
2. Sabotage of the railways and industry 3. Terror tactics against Germans, Volkdeutsch and anyone else co-operating with the enemy 4. Reprisals against expulsions, seizures, executions and repression 5. Self defense relying on the liberation of those arrested 6. Guerrilla warfare. The Commander of Armed Forces within the country ordered the increase or decrease of such activity according to needs or the current situation. AK High Command prepared guidelines for sabotage and diversionary actions for particular Areas and Districts and defined limits for such actions. Frequently, however, the armed activity of various local AK units exceeded these limits and contingen-cies, depending on the situation in a given locality.
An analysis of Kedyw operations during 1943-1944 entirely confirms the above rules of engagement. Among other characteris-tics was the targeting of active functionaries of the German terror apparatus, who were so dangerous to Poles, rather than the name-less mass of enemy soldiers. This was directly derived from the concept of the Uprising in differentiating between the Nazi party apparatus and administration, and the German army.
1943 saw the initial phase of extending the guerrilla movement of the AK on a wider scale. The height of its activity was in 1944. From the beginning of 1943 based on the Kedyw group, guerrilla detach-ments began to rapid development. The dynamic growth of the guerrilla movement caused the Germans at the end of 1942 to undertake pacification action in Zamosc. This was met with a deter-mined but well planned Polish counterattack. This issue became a subject for debate at Government RP and General Staff C-in-C level, which considered the justifiable concern that such actions did not develop into a full-blown uprising, which at that time had no chance of success.
In general, 1943 in the sphere of concepts and in carrying out the day-to-day battle was a year that saw the AK entering into a phase referred to as "combat within limits". There is no room in this outline to describe the whole spectrum of the armed actions of the AK. One can only note that from the beginning of 1941 to the middle of 1944 the following statistics: 732 enemy transport trains derailed, 19,058 railway wagons destroyed, 38 railway bridges blown up, 25,145 acts of sabotage carried out, 5,733 assassinations carried out on Germans. One of the severest communications blows dealt to the Germans was the "Wieniec" [Wreath] action undertaken in October 1942 that simultaneously stopped all rail traffic around Warsaw for many hours. One typical sort of AK action was liberating captives of the Germans. As an example of such an operation there was the freeing in 18 January 1943 of "Wachiarz" officers from Pinsk. The freeing of Scoutmaster Jan Bytnar, codena-me "Rudego' from the hands of the Gestapo on 26th March in Warsaw had a great psychological effect. This operation, very effectively carried out in the middle of the day in the center of a major town proved to the public and soldiers of the AK that if they were arrested they had at least a chance of returning to freedom. This operation was described by Aleksander Kaminski in one of the most famous books of the Polish Underground "Kamie-nie Na Szaniec" [Stones on the Rampart]. Captives were liberated all over occupied Poland. In August 1943, 60 captives were liberated from prison in Jasle.
One of the fundamental types of operation was attacking re-presentatives of the German terror apparatus, or as it was known, "the battle against the Gestapo". A series of such operations took place between 1943-1944. Among others, in December 1943, Emil Braun, one of the perpetrators of mass arrests and organizers of the plan to deport Warsaw's population, was liquidated. The most spectacular operation was the elimination in 1 February 1944 of Chief of SS and Police, Warsaw District, General Franz Kutschera. The "Parasol" unit of Kedyw High Command carried this out.
As has been already mentioned, the AK carried out sabotage and diversionary action beyond the borders of the Second Republic. Towards the west, one of the detachments founded in May 1942, Special Combat Organization codename "Zagralin" specialised in these sorts of operations. In the first half of 1943 it carried out 10 bomb attacks in Berlin. To the east, beyond the Polish border, the already mentioned "Wach-larz' undertook numerous operations.
The existence and operational activity on a greater scale of guerrilla units and their activities, had a value which could not be measured in purely military terms - they maintained morale in a society oppressed by occupation. A particular role fell to the guerrilla fighters, and to the AK as a whole in the eastern districts. Not only the Germans threatened the Polish people. In Wolyn and in the Lwow Area Districts there was also the Ukrainian problem. The AK forces had to act in many directions - they had to fight the Germans and at the same time protect Poles from Ukrainian massacres. Following the murders of many Poles by the Ukrainians, in May 1943 the Commander Wolyn District AK ordered the formation of Polish self-defense units in areas with high Polish population. These self-defense units, supported by AK guerrilla units played an enormous role in protecting these threatened Polish populations. One of the biggest self-defense areas, in Przebraz, at the beginning of 1944, provided refuge for 25,000 Poles.
No less complicated was the situation of guerrilla units of the AK in Nowogrod and Wilno. In these areas, the AK forces while fighting the Germans, had to protect Poles from Soviet partisans who regarded these territories as part of the USSR (an effect of the Russian-German pact of 1939) and considered all AK units as operating illegally on these lands. In accordance with their orders, from 1st December 1943, these Soviet partisans were to disarm AK soldiers, and if they resisted, shoot them on the spot. This state of affairs limited the activities of the AK. On the one hand, they found themselves fighting the Germans and their policy of exterminating Poles, and on the other, they found themselves up against Soviet partisans who intended to liquidate the Armia Krajowa.
Many factors affected the development of the guerrilla forces. One of the best known guerrilla units of the AK was the group operating in the Kielce District, commanded by Lieutenant Jan Piwnik code-name "Ponury" [Gloomy], numbering by the summer of 1943 over 300 people and very active in combat. Another region of particularly intense activity was Lublin. In the second half of 1943, 22 guerrilla units were active in the area, numbering about one thousand soldiers. There was no lack of AK guerrilla units in the Pomerania District, where operating under very difficult conditions at least 15 units and forest groups were active. The guerrilla movement also developed on the territory of the Krakow District. Among other units was the "Halniak" which smashed a German punitive ex-pedition, and rescued the village of Sulkowice from destruction. Particularly high activity took place in Wilno and Nowogrod Districts. There, AK units smashed Wermacht posts (as in Osienniki), and liquidated German personnel (as in Horodnia in January 1944) and broke prisons open (as in Lida, freeing seventy people). A major problem on these territories were the Lithuanian units commanded by General Plechavitius collaborating with the Ger-mans. In Murowana Oszmianka, in May 1944, the AK destroyed just such a battalion for persecuting the Polish population. As a result of very effective activity by the guerrilla units of the AK, part of the region found itself completely under AK control.
AK guerrilla activity reached its peak in 1944 with operation "Burza", which was set in motion with the encroachment onto Polish soil by the Soviet army. The first to react was Wolyn District AK, which mobilized the 27th Wolyn Infantry Division AK. At its peak, the division numbered some 6,000 soldiers commanded by 100 officers and non-commissioned officers. The internal structure of this unit, its armaments, its battle tactics and its combat operations on the front line was identical to that of a regular army formation. The battling advance of the division of over 500 kilometers took it from Wolyn through Polesie to the Lublin area. That part of the division that broke through the front line to the Soviet side found itself either interned, or integrated into General Berling's units. On arriving in the Lublin area, the division was disarmed and interned by the Soviets. So, although the 27th Wolyn Division was untypical of AK units in view of its long fighting advance and the set-piece battles it fought, it was typical in its fate on meeting the Soviet Army. They initially fought side-by-side at the front, and supported the Red Army. They were then disarmed by the Russians and given a choice: either internment and deportation to the depths of the USSR, or integration into the communist dominated armies of General Berling. In April 1944, Wilno and Nowogrod Districts joined Operation "Burza". The dominant element in this part of "Burza" was Operation "Ostra Brama", whose aim was to take control of Wilno. The battles fought by the AK did not succeed in taking Wilno independently, but their reconnaissance of the German fortifications considerably eased the task of the advancing Red Army. Here as well, when the AK regrouped after the battle, they were surrounded and interned by the Russians.
A few units that had escaped arrest remained at large in the field, and tried to defend themselves while suffering losses. In April, Districts of the Lwow Area joined "Burza'. During the battles for Lwow, the AK suppor-ted the Soviet motorized forces, which, without this sort of infantry support could not have fought effectively. After fighting side-by-side with the Russians, the soldiers of the AK were arrested and deported to the east. Also in April, Lublin District, one of the strongest AK districts, Bialystok District and part of Krakow District joined "Burza".
In 1944, the AK's fight culminated in the open battle for Warsaw. This two-month long conflict for the capital city was the AK's greatest battle. Although the battle was in terms of territory restricted to one city, its repercussions went much further. The Warsaw Uprising brought into focus the most fundamental problems Poland experienced during the last war. It was the resolute and emphatic voice of the Polish Underground State, and more importantly, the voice of the civilian population of Warsaw supporting it and demanding the right to independently decide on the fate of their State and Nation. The decision to fight for Warsaw came about as a result of the unbreakable fusion of political, military and psycho-logical factors. The retreat of the German armies - to regain independent control of Poland's capital, and there for the cons-titutional Polish authorities to begin openly fulfilling their duties before the Soviets entered - and the long wished for battle against the oppressor - all these things went into the decision to undertake the battle for Warsaw. On 1st August 1944, the Warsaw Uprising began. Numbering over 45,000 soldiers, the forces of the AK were poorly equipped, but well trained and ready for battle. For the first four days of the battle, the initiative belonged to the Poles. After that it went into the hands of the enemy. One should underline that the terrain held by the Poles did not constitute one concentrated stronghold, but was criss-crossed by enemy lines. Nevertheless, the battle for Warsaw was not a chaotic shooting gallery in various city districts, but a regularly controlled battle. On one side of the conflict stood a poorly armed but covertly well trained volunteer army, and on the other stood a German regular army, supported by air power and armor and which could bring reserves to the front line whenever it needed to. The German forces used to suppress the Uprising were not much smaller than those used in Africa in the 1941-1943 campaign of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The intensity of fighting in Warsaw was comparable only to that in Stalingrad. It was therefore the only battle of its type in Europe during the Second World War conducted with such ferocity; conducted for 63 days by an underground army. This struggle took place immediately behind the German-Russian front lines, and drew many German forces away from that battlefront as well as causing havoc among German re-supply and reinforcements to the front. It was, therefore, of invaluable assistance to the efforts on the eastern front. Despite the Polish units' effectiveness, their fervor for the battle, and the support of the civilian population of Warsaw, the Armia Krajowa' 5 battle for the capital city in the reality of the situation of 1944 never stood a chance of victory. This was entirely due to the policy of the tripartite pact signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The Warsaw Uprising uncovered the true attitude of these powers to Poland's fate. Military and technical assistance from the USSR was made impossible because of the Soviet hostility to the lawful authorities of Poland and their representatives within the country and to our desire for independence. Furthermore as well as because of the distances involved, help from the western Allies was
limited for political reasons. One only has to remember the fate of the American expedition, and the refusal by the USSR to allow it to land on Soviet territory. Its halting of the return of the Soviet offensive after the battle of Radzymin completed the drama of the Warsaw Uprising. Even taking into account the entirety of the problems of Warsaw's solitary battle, the Warsaw Uprising constitutes a unique military and political experiment during World War II. At the time, in the heat of battle, Warsaw breathed the air of freedom after years of enslavement and persecution. The appropriate structures of the Delegature of the Polish Government and the AK tried to organize common daily life in these most uncommon conditions. "The Polish State emerges from the Underground" procialmed the "Biuletyn Informacyjny" [Information Bulletin] of the 5th August. And that is what counted most. After 63 days of battle on 2nd October, an agreement to halt military action was signed. The Warsaw Corps of the Armia Krajowa went away to German prisons, and the civilian population abandoned their city, now utterly destroyed by the enemy. and i'
The end of the Uprising did not mean the end of the AK, the Polish Home Army. It undertook further military action that was made more difficult by the cooling-down of the eastern front on Polish territory for several months. The tasks of the AK under German occupation during "Burza" testified to the will of the Lw6~
nation to defend itself and uncompromisingly fight the Germans. In view of the approaching winter the Kielce Corps of the AK that had been mobilised earlier in the summer and had then marched towards Warsaw, was split up. AK detachments in the Podkarpacki region, as before, foiled German attempts at pacification of villages and defended them. Among other things, in October they engaged in one of the biggest battles in the Podhale region at Ochotnica. Operations were revived in January 1945, with the renewed Soviet offensive.
The military operations of the AK as described above, although they are the most discernible, formed only a part of the full range of the AK's wartime achievements. Just as plain, in the eyes of its own society, as well as in the eyes of the enemy, was the highly developed system of information and propaganda. Its central office was the Bureau of Information and Propaganda "BIP", in AK High Command, and was headed in turn by Major Tadeusz Kruk-Strzelecki codename "Director", Lieutenant Colonel Jan Rzepecki "Prezes" ["Chairman"], and Captain Kazimierz Moczarski "Grawer" ["Engraver"]. In reply to the attempts by the Germans to influence Polish society with their Nazi-controlled press, and to cut it off from the world by the simultaneous confiscation of radio receivers, BIP undertook a campaign of education, information and propaganda. It helped the public to maintain belief in victory; it encouraged answerability and discipline to the orders of the Polish Government in Exile and the authorities within the country. A particular role in this multi-faceted enterprise to win hearts and minds was played by the Underground press and publishers, which could undoubtedly be called the "paper weapon". The central press organ of the AK was the "Biuletyn Informacyjny", published between November 1939 and January 1945, edited first by the remarkable teacher and academic Aleksander Kaminski and later by Kazimierz Kumaniecki. The prudently and responsibly edited "Biuletyn Informacyjny" was a credible and trustworthy publication. It became the best known and most widely read publication of the Polish Underground State. In 1944 it reached a circulation of over 40,000 copies. It was one of the few regularly appearing, printed underground newspapers in Europe. In the AK Districts, it appeared in local editions, such as the "Czerwien Lands Information Bulletin" circulation 2,000 in the Lwow region, or the "Lesser Poland Information Bulletin' cir-culation 3,000 in Krakow. The central and local press, with its effective distribution network, reached every AK Local Command area. Condensed publications were also distributed. Important from the propaganda point of view was the printing and distribution in plain view on street corners fake editions of Nazi-produced news-papers that the Germans used to try and influence Polish society. In describing the propaganda operations of the AK we should return to the already mentioned Operation "N" which was in its way a form of psychological warfare. Its purpose was to psychologically under-mine the German army and German society by creating the pretence of an anti-Hitler opposition in Germany itself. This was done by the AK disseminating leaflets and periodicals written and produced in excellent German, such as "Der Soldat". All of Operation "N" was very effectively carried out under the direction of Captain Tadeusz Zenczykowski "Kowalik" [Little Blacksmith], and was directly rela-ted to preparations for the Uprising. All of the above publishing activity of the AK, in all its various aspects would have been impossible without technical back up, in other words, the Underg-round printing works. Within AK High Command between 1940-1944 existed the "Tajne Wojskowe Zakady Wydawnicze"[Secret Army Publishers] headed by Jerzy Rutkowski code-name "Michal Kmita". This was an underground printing concern without parallel on such a scale in all of underground Europe. TWZW had at its disposal underground printing works in Warsaw (at the turn of 1943-1944 there were five), its own bookbinding workshop and the only half tone process (photo-engraving) works in occupied Europe. Its average monthly print run of periodicals at the turn of 1943-1944 reached almost 250,000 copies, and of pamphlets- 65,000. Overall the TWZW released several million copies of underground newspapers, over a million pamphlets, military instruc-tions, and other condensed publications, plus about one million copies of Operation "N' printed matter. They were all of a very high production standard. Other publishing centers were Lwow with its Lwow Secret Army Printing Works (LTDW) and Krakow with its Krakow Army Publishing Establishments (KWZW).
Hidden to public view, and also unseen but very troublesome for the enemy were the AK intelligence operations. Department II (Intelligence) of High Command AK was in turn comman-ded by Lieutenant Colonel Waclaw Berka code-name "Brodowicz, Lieutenant Colonel Marian Drobik "Dzieciol", Lieutenant Colonel Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki "Makary", and Lieutenant Colonel Bohdan Zielinski "Tytus". The intelligence network of the AK in time encompassed all of occupied Europe. Among the greatest accomplis-hments of the AK intelligence service was the reconnaissance of the German army dispositions before the advance on the USSR, and in predicting the main directions the German attack would take. The most spectacular operation, however, was the locating of the Ger-man "V" weapons launching sites in Peenemunde and later in 1944 in Pustkow. In finding the launch sites, they were able to recover parts from a V-2 rocket and with great expertise sent them to London via the Air Bridge. One should add that the effectiveness and results of AK intelligence operations were very highly valued by the western Allies.
In addition to the combat units, the propaganda and intelligence service, nearly every branch of the regular army was represented within the AK. This was tied in with the established principles of the Uprising. Clearly, not all branches were developed to the same degree, some only existed at High Command level. As examples we should mention the Geographic Service, which as the only one in occupied Europe, undertook the clandestine production and dist-ribution of maps. Present at various levels, the Armaments Service and Clandestine Production Department AK High Command un-dertook the covert production of war materiel and arms. Among other things, they produced 350,000 complete hand grenades, and over 70 tones of explosives. They also manufactured machine guns such as the original Polish "Blyskawica" [Lightning] machine gun, based on the air dropped English "Sten". The biggest centers of clandestine weapons production were Warsaw, Krakow and the Swietokrzyskie [Holy Cross] Mountains region. Overall they produ-ced a thousand machine guns, which, under the conditions of German occupation was a number without precedent in occupied Europe. At every level of the AK were the Commissariat, Health Service, Pastoral Service and the Women's Army Service. The Justice Service and its Special Military Courts formed, with the Special Civilian Courts, an underground Administration of Justice system. These services that had for years been taking shape underg-round, could not always reveal their effectiveness - at least not until the general uprising. However, an analysis of their operation during the Warsaw Uprising shows that they were well prepared from every aspect for their planned activity, similar to the many years of preparation for an uprising that bore fruit during "Burza" in bringing units to battle and striking at accurately chosen and important objectives.
In January 1945 as a result of the Soviet offensive, the Russian-German front line quickly started moving westwards. Expe-rience on the eastern front had shown the AK unequivocally that the Russians, ever advancing onto Polish territory, would not tolerate armed forces independent of the USSR, answerable only to the lawful authorities of the Polish Republic, with whom the USSR had broken diplomatic relations since 1943. As we have already mentioned, after initial co-operation on the battle field, and after taking advantage of the very real assistance offered by the AK, the Soviets then proceeded to disarm them, intern them and even execute particular officer cadres of the AK. Not without reason did the Lublin AK report to the General Staff C-in-C that. NKVD terror is the same as Gestapo terror". Taking into account the situation east of the front line, the Government RP decided on l4th November to demobilize the clandestine and AK guerrilla units in that area, separating and retaining, however, a number of personnel for further covert activity. The tearing apart of the organizational network and the existing state of affairs meant the many soldiers ofthe AK concealed themselves, and returned underground and that the AK continued to exist. In view of the rapid advance of the January offensive, the Commander of the Armia Krajowa, General Leopold Okulicki took the decision to dissolve the AK. On the l9th January 1945, the Armia Krajowa, the Polish Home Army, was dissolved. The order of General Okulicki formally concluded the history of the AK. Then began a very difficult period known as 'The eradication of the Armia Krajowa. The communists took control of Polish soil. To maintain control, they had to depend on the armed forces, police and politics of a foreign eastern power. Terror and extermination of the AK on territory liberated from the Germans forced AK soldiers to hide, keep their identities secret and return to an underground existence. Some joined detachments in the forests, which gave them a certain sense of security and at the same time allowing them to protect local people from the terror of the "People's" authorities. This was on one hand an expression of loyalty to the lawful authorities of the Polish Republic in London, and on the other hand was forced by communist terror. One has to remember that the AK was not an army that lived in barracks, but a clandestine army drawn from society itself which had had a new structural system and new borders forced on it. Apart from these fundamental issues, the demobilization itself of this army, the duration it took for demobilization orders to reach every single local detachment lasted some time. The Council for National Unity declared itself prepared to talk with the Russians on the basis of the Yalta resolutions. This influenced General Okulicki, who before complying with the above resolution and attending the talks in March 1945 nominated Lieutenant Colonel Jan Rzepecki "Ozog" [Fire Iron] as Army Commander within the country, and accepted the structural scheme and tasks of the post-AK underground army which was to operate together with the civilian authorities of the Polish Underground State. On the basis if the AK cadre, Colonel Rzepecki formed the Armed Forces Delegature (SZ), which gained acceptance by the Commander in Chief General Wiadyslaw Anders. The Delegate of the SZ had the personnel, court and disciplinary rights of the Commander of the now dissolved AK. The Delegate SZ as well as the authorities of the RP in exile rejected armed struggle with the new communist authorities and the Red Army as unrealistic in their present situation. This does not mean that armed action did not take place. These actions were, however, in the nature of acts of self-defense, the greater part of them being operation to liberate captives after the mass arrests of AK soldiers. The Temporary Government of National Unity was formed, which apparently implemented the Yalta resolutions, decided to end the activity of the Council for National Unity and the Delegature of the Polish Government in Exile, within the country. On 5th April, the governments of Great Britain and the United States withdrew their recognition of the lawful Government of the Republic of Poland operating in London. Colonel Jan Mazurkiewicz, the Delegate SZ Central Area was arrested by the security services. He decided to reveal the identities of his subordinates, which on the one hand allowed the legalization of many AK soldiers who up until then had to remain underground, but on the other hand it exposed their wartime record to scrutiny by the communist authorities. In a more and more complicated situa-tion, on 5th August Colonel Rzepecki at a briefing of Area Comman-ders of the Delegature SZ decided to dissolve the Delegature. This structure which extended the history of the AK ceased to exist. The dissolution of the Delegature SZ and the clearance of units from the forests took, as in the case of the AK, some time. Forced by the situation and by communist terror post-AK detachments continued to operate in various parts of the country, as before conducting self-defense operations. However, in view of the continuing repres-sion, the burden of the former AK soldiers' battle shifted in emphasis from an armed struggle to that of a fight for the moral values of society, about honor, about the imponderables of nation-hood. In other words about preserving the tradition of fighting for independence and handing it on to future generations.

Soldiers of the Polish Home Army after World War II

Even before the Conference of the Three Major Powers in Yalta (February 1945), which proved to be tragic in its consequences for Poland, the situation of the soldiers in the Polish Home Army (AK) found on occupied Polish territory as the Soviet Red Army marched west was extremely difficult. The NKWD (Soviet Secret Police) began arresting Polish officers and forcing soldiers to join a Polish Communist Army. The Yalta Conference which constituted a further step in the division of post©war Europe among the victorious powers clearly defined Poland as a country belonging to the USSR zone of influence, a fact that all the declarations on the necessity of holding democratic elections and on instituting a democratic order in Poland did not change. The lack of protest against the position of Moscow during the Warsaw Insurrection, as well as against the massacre at Katyn (as of 1943, Britain and the U.S.A. knew that the USSR was its perpetrator) gave the Red Army a free hand in Poland. What counted most for the United States was to have the USSR participate in the war against Germany until the very end, to have it join in the war against Japan and to ensure the quickest possible return of the American soldiers to the U.S.A. The small European countries including Poland had no means of opposing the decisions of the Three Major Powers.
In view of this situation and given the increasing numbers of deportations and arrests of Polish Home Army soldiers who had fought during the war against the German invader, on January 19, 1945, the AK High Command issued an order dissolving the Home Army that during the war years comprised about 400 000 soldiers. The next blow came with the deceitful arrest, deportation to Moscow and "judgement" of 16 leaders of the Polish Underground Government, including the Head of the Home Army. With no hope of winning, some armed AK members in Poland continued to fight, this time against communist rule, in order to avoid being arrested. The authorities imposed on Poland arrested, tortured and even condemned to death meritorious members of the AK who had fought for Poland's independence. Some were deported to the USSR from where very few returned to Poland after several or even many years. Despite such persecutions and discrimination, the AK soldiers slowly returned to civil life. Those who were fortunate enough to get through to Western Europe began organising their activity. An Association of former AK soldiers was established in London, England. Its main goals were to encourage contact among former AK members dispersed all over the world, to offer help to those in need and to battle in the political arena against the communist regime in Poland.

Later, after the Polish State regained sovereignty in 1989, the former AK soldiers residing in Poland began to get organised. The World Federation of AK Soldiers (SZZAK) was born in March 1990 from the amalgamation of the AK Soldiers Association with the AK Soldiers Federation and brought together about 60 thousand former soldiers. A resolution to that effect was passed at the Delegates Conference in Warsaw. The now deceased Lieutenant©Colonel Wojciech Borzobohaty was elected as President of the Federation. The new organisation which grew out of the tradition of fighting for independence reunites former soldiers of the Polish Home Army. At the 1990 Conference, delegates of the Federation settled its essential problems. They elected its leaders, passed its statutes and ratified motions defining its
main lines of action and its position regarding certain issues of the leaders' policy. The Statutes of the World Federation define its duties as follows:

ensuring social aid to AK veterans and due compensation to their families;
tightening the bonds of friendship among former comrades in arms after 45 years of isolation;
removing the infamy thrust upon AK by the Communists, an infamy maintained through many years of indoctrinating society.

Even before the Federation was formally established those goals were spontaneously pursued in Poland in many AK circles, mainly with the help of the Church. Celebrations were organised to commemorate special events and the heroism of AK soldiers, and many hundreds of plaques, stone monuments and symbolic tombs were permanently placed in churches and cemeteries and at sites of combat. The existing organisations were absorbed by the newly created World Federation of AK Soldiers (SZZAK) and grouped into Districts whose limits usually corresponded with those of Poland's administrative units. Some of the districts group together AK soldiers from former eastern provinces which now remain beyond Poland's borders. Today only a minimal number of the former AK soldiers residing in Poland still remain outside the Federation. Some AK circles active in the West announced their decision to join the newly formed Federation while expressing the need to emphasise their solidarity with the Federation's activity and goals.
The 6th Conference of Delegates of the World Federation of AK Soldiers took place from the 21 to 23 May, 2002 at Dom Polonii (Polish Home) in Pultusk near Warsaw. Some of the issues discussed on this occasion were: co©operation with the territorial authorities of the Republic of Poland and the defence of AK's ethos which continues to be attacked unofficially by those representatives of government authorities who were trained in the days of the Polish People's Republic. Discussions focused on how to prevent amendment of the Combatants' Bill which would restore combatant rights to former members of the repressive People's Republic regime and on how to defend combatants' privileges in danger of being eroded for allegedly budgetary reasons. While the discussion of these issues was factual, a strong emotional undercurrent was also evident. The AK soldiers who lived in Poland were subjected for over 50 years to constant attacks from the so called "defenders of democracy" and so they are hardly inclined to recognise them, now that Poland is free, as their comrades in arms. And that is exactly the aim of the proposed amendment. The intervention of the so©called "foreigners", i.e. delegates from areas beyond Poland's borders was limited solely to suggesting to the assembly and those who delegated them the need for societal action inciting people to vote in greater numbers at the time of elections for the legislative body, thus forcing the latter towards fuller pronouncements on the subject.
Another issue at stake was the statutory changes to the Federation, especially the changes concerning the statutes of the so©called foreign districts of SZZAK. The initiative for the discussion of this subject came from the Montreal Section which prepared a draft of the clause defining this issue. The draft was approved by the Conference. The proposed changes outline the autonomy of foreign districts. Therefore each district acting beyond Poland's borders is independent and acts according to its own statutes, in conformity with the laws prevailing in the country where its members have settled. None of these districts have to pay formal membership fees to the Administration Board in Warsaw. Financial support of the actions undertaken by colleagues in Poland comes from the subscriptions to the Information Bulletin published by the Board of Administration, as well as from unsolicited donations. As an example of the latter, the acquisition of a new computer for the editorial staff of the Information Bulletin was financed by three foreign districts acting on the American continent. Without their help this necessary investment would not have been possible.
The Association of former AK Soldiers in Montreal, which is part of the World Federation of AK Soldiers headquartered in Warsaw, was founded in Montreal in 1949, under the name: Independent Section of the London AK Association. Its main goal was to provide help to AK soldiers residing in Poland, who were often persecuted, as well as to help their families. In the same way help was offered to the families of fallen soldiers and of those who were murdered by the two occupying forces. At the same time, the Association took part in the action for Poland's independence, maintained contact with former comrades in arms living in foreign lands and helped edit and publish essays on the fight for Poland's sovereignty and on the history of the AK. It undertook actions intended to reach society in the western world and to remind the latter that former AK members continue to be very active in Polish circles abroad. Among other acts, it commissioned a commemorative plaque in Ottawa in honour of the Canadian aviators who lost their lives during war flights to Poland. From the very beginning, the Montreal Section was publishing an Information Bulletin and organising frequent social gatherings.
Immediately after SZZAK was founded, the Montreal AK members decided to join the Federation. At the general meeting of the Montreal Section held on May 16, 1992, a vote was taken on a motion in this mater. Exactly 2/3 of qualified votes were in favor of the motion, three members were against it and five members abstained from voting. Similarly, in Toronto, the majority of members voted to join SZZAK. On September 29, 1998 at a meeting of the Administration Board in Warsaw, the Montreal Section formally entered the ranks of the World Federation of AK Soldiers.